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ANTITRUST BY OTHER MEANS: HALEY ON 
FORM AND FUNCTION 
SALIL K. MEHRA∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To celebrate Professor John Haley’s work would mean for most to 
consider his place in the study of Japanese law, an important place indeed. 
But the focus of this Essay is slightly different. Instead, it seeks to avoid 
giving Haley’s place in antitrust short shrift in this Festschrift. In 
particular, Haley approached comparative antitrust law before it was 
actually a field. In doing so, he pioneered a way of thinking about both the 
form and function of enforcement that is relevant to the design of 
competition law regimes today. 
To understand how Haley’s work remains relevant, it is worth noting 
three important aspects of what his research did. First, he managed to 
articulate a conception of comparative antitrust law during a time when 
antitrust was often cast as a largely American show. Second, he 
demonstrated the importance of institutions and legal infrastructure to 
antitrust law, and how antitrust might function with remedies other than 
our own. Finally, he explicated the role of politics and political theory in 
providing a basis for antitrust within a society. 
II. COMPARATIVE ANTITRUST IN AN ANTITRUST-SCARCE WORLD 
Today, it is easy to think of competition law as subject to a near-global 
consensus. Since the early 1990s, the world has seen the establishment of 
antitrust regimes in the Eastern European transition economies,1 Latin 
America,2 China,3 and India.4 Additionally, during this period the 
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 1. See Tibor Varady, The Emergence of Competition Law in (Former) Socialist Countries, 47 
AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 244–48 (1999). 
 2. See D. DANIEL SOKOL, LATIN AMERICAN ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS (forthcoming 2009). 
 3. H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Rodney J. Ganske, The Monopolization and IP Abuse Provisions of 
China’s Anti-monopoly Law: Concerns and a Proposal, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 213, 213 (2008). 
 4. See Eleanor Fox, India: The Long Road to a Full-Function Competition Law, ANTITRUST, 
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European Union has established a particularly vigorous transnational 
competition law enforcement arm.5 Japan, too, has taken steps to 
reinvigorate the often quiet Japanese Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”).6 
Beyond these steps at the national level, there have also been recent 
moves, the results of which are yet unclear, to harmonize existing 
competition law via a number of international organizations, including the 
Organization for Economic Coordination and Development, the 
International Competition Network, and the World Trade Organization.7 
The changes at both the national and international levels represent a 
growing consensus on the benefits of competition law harmonization and 
the harms of certain practices, most notably hard-core cartels. 
Additionally, competition law has become trendy in the sense that nations 
have come to accept that having their own antitrust law is a hallmark of 
being a player in the world trading system. 
And yet it was not always so. Indeed, quite recently, even nations that 
were indisputably major players in the world trading system did so with 
meager portions of antitrust on their development menus. As Haley 
pointed out in an in-depth study, a “perceived failure of enforcement was a 
major theme in discussion of antitrust policy in both the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Japan” during the 1970s.8 As a result, it was common to 
conceive of antitrust law as a largely American creation; one of the most 
important academic lines of inquiry at the time was the degree to which 
the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law beyond American borders created 
 
 
Spring 2007, at 72. 
 5. See RICHARD WHISH, Overview of EC and UK Competition Law, in COMPETITION LAW (5th 
ed. 2005) (describing increased activity in European Union competition law). 
 6. During the Koizumi era, several important changes potentially strengthened the JFTC. In 
2003, it was moved from a location under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication to a 
position that is organizationally under the Cabinet Office, thus more directly under the Prime Minister. 
In 2004, a large revision of the Antimonopoly Law led to a significant increase in the administrative 
surcharge levied on cartels from six to ten percent of cartel turnover. Additionally, in that year, the 
JFTC adopted a new set of merger review guidelines that harmonized and clarified its enforcement 
goals. Finally, throughout the Koizumi era, the JFTC engaged in an advocacy program aimed at 
fostering a so-called “competition culture” among the domestic business community. It is perhaps too 
early to tell whether these moves will have actual results. 
 7. See, e.g., KY P. EWING, COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM 
AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE 51–52 (2003) (reporting on efforts by the OECD, WTO, and ICN to 
harmonize competition laws and expressing optimism about the ICN due to its focus on “antitrust 
only; antitrust all the time”); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their 
Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 158 (2009) (describing efforts of OECD, UN, and WTO on 
international antitrust cooperation and singling out the ICN as having “created significant momentum” 
for cooperation). 
 8. John O. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions and Remedies: A Comparative Study of German and 
Japanese Law, 59 WASH. L. REV. 471, 471 (1984) [hereinafter Haley, Antitrust Sanctions]. 
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improper tension with what were considered the legitimate interests of 
other nations not to enforce competition norms.9 
In particular, Haley’s was a study of how the Japanese and Germans 
were trying to recharge their seemingly toothless antitrust regimes. This 
emphasis is interesting more for its relevance to today’s problems than to 
America’s problems in the 1980s, when Haley began to write on this 
subject. After all, in the early 1980s, U.S. antitrust enforcement was often 
seen as having been overly active. As a result, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the study of antitrust in American law schools focused on improving 
substantive rules about what conduct to punish.10 By contrast, Haley was 
trying to study how nations tried to move from little or no enforcement to 
higher levels. Given the new antitrust regimes established since the 1990s 
in transition and emerging economies, this is a problem that has arguably 
become substantially more relevant since Haley first approached the topic. 
Haley’s comparison of West German and Japanese antitrust regimes to 
each other and to the United States remains interesting in part for what it is 
not. Haley avoided a direct critique of differences in the substance of 
antitrust law.11 His stated principle goals were the means and degree of 
enforcement.12 The aim was not to illustrate specific different, better 
substantive antitrust rules that might be transplanted. Rather, his work 
formed an attempt to explain the larger mechanics behind how these 
formerly occupied nations metabolized the antitrust law that America had 
force-fed them.  
For Haley, antitrust was a vehicle for studying comparative law. His 
focus was “enforcement itself, not the policy being enforced—that is, 
whether, irrespective of the policies being enforced, differences in the 
sanctions used, the processes involved, and the degree or level of 
enforcement attained are themselves consequential factors in either 
promoting or restricting trade.”13 Thus, his work was not about, for 
example, other countries’ differing treatment of resale price maintenance 
relative to the United States.14 In hindsight, this is somewhat remarkable 
 
 
 9. The leading treatise on the subject was quite influential in making this point. KINGMAN 
BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958). 
 10. See, e.g., infra note 15. 
 11. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions, supra note 8, at 472. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See John O. Haley, Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust Enforcement: Do Differences 
Matter?, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 303, 305 (1995). 
 14. See Salil K. Mehra, Copyright, Control and Comics: Japanese Battles over Downstream 
Limits on Content, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 181 (2003). In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the 
ninety-year history of the per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance, raising the possibility 
that the United States might move toward the more lenient treatment seen in Japan and Germany; 
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given the contemporaneous focus in the United States on substantive 
antitrust law, particularly the implications of law and economics on the 
treatment of specific antitrust violations.15 
In this regard, Haley’s work remains relevant today. In particular, when 
he started to focus on Japanese and German antitrust, it was not accepted 
wisdom that developed nations needed to have an American-style antitrust 
regime. As a result, Haley proceeded from a quiet assumption that antitrust 
was a universal impulse, at least in developed nations.16 That said, he 
maintained agnosticism on the benefits of antitrust; as he put it, “[w]hether 
competition policies either inhibited or aided economic recovery and 
growth in either Japan or Germany remains contested.”17 During the 1980s 
in particular, policymakers sometimes faulted American antitrust law as 
putting American industry at a disadvantage versus their advancing 
foreign competitors.18 Ironically, Haley’s question of how nations with 
weak regimes invigorate themselves was perhaps not as timely then as it is 
now, as the adoption and reinvigoration of competition regimes has come 
in vogue. 
III. FUNCTION AND FORM IN ENFORCEMENT 
Haley’s main focus was on how different nations design their antitrust 
enforcement and what that tells us about their legal system. To Haley, 
“[e]xamination of the sanctions and remedies of German and Japanese 
antitrust law . . . highlights features of the German and Japanese legal 
 
 
however, it remains to be seen whether the United States would similarly authorize conduct as per se 
legal, which these nations have done for certain product categories. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 15. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 56 
(1978) (describing tensions between antitrust’s then concern with “small-producer welfare” with 
Robert Bork’s preferred metric of “consumer welfare”); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 4 (1976) (stating that “efficiency . . . should be the only goal of antitrust 
law,” and setting forth the “implications for [substantive antitrust] law of adopting this view of its 
purpose”). 
 16. In his later work on comparative antitrust, Haley makes explicit the assumption that antitrust 
likely follows industrialization. John Haley, Competition Policy for East Asia, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 277, 283 (2004) (stating that “the perceived evils of monopoly power and restraints of 
competition have been viewed largely as the ills of advanced industrial states” and that it is “difficult 
to single out a case in which the effective implementation of competition legislation preceded 
economic development”). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Indeed, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006), 
recently addressed by the Supreme Court in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 
155 (2004), was passed as part of an attempt to lessen this “burden” on American business as it 
competed in foreign markets against other nations’ multinationals, including those of Japan and 
Germany. 
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systems that are often obscured by a focus on substantive law . . . .”19 
Thus, he took antitrust to be a kind of common impulse that would work 
its way through a developed nation’s legal system. In a sense, Haley 
started with an unstated assumption that the antitrust regimes of Germany 
and Japan must express themselves in some way. Even if they were 
viewed as relatively passive compared to the United States, the ways in 
which they tried to act, even if frustrated, would be telling. Simply put, the 
choice of tool would indicate what tools could be used. 
In particular, remedies became crucial to this test of legal systems. For 
Haley, the hallmark of these systems was a lack of power to address 
violators. He recognized that “the Federal Republic [of Germany] and 
Japan share a common weakness in antitrust enforcement—the lack of 
effective legal sanctions . . . .”20 That is, given wrongdoing, the fact that 
judges and regulators were relatively powerless in Germany and Japan 
when compared to the United States seemed to show a general lack of 
legal enforcement power in those societies.  
Most prominently, the lack of judicial contempt power in Germany and 
Japan, according to Haley, undermined effective antitrust, at least as 
pursued through courts.21 This was particularly central to Japanese 
regulators, because, as Haley points out, German regulators had greater 
access in reality to criminal prosecution for antitrust violations than did 
their Japanese counterparts.22 Under this account, because neither judicial 
nor administrative orders could be enforced with contempt power in Japan, 
judges and bureaucrats were less likely to use such orders to deal with 
antitrust violators. Though the contention that Japanese courts did not have 
the power to enforce their orders is not uncontested,23 the relative 
 
 
 19. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions, supra note 8, at 472. 
 20. Id. at 474. 
 21. Id. at 474–75. 
 22. Id. at 475–81. Even the few Japanese cases leading to criminal prosecutions have led only to 
suspended criminal sentences, including the famous 1970s oil cartel cases. See JOHN O. HALEY, 
ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 1947–1998, at 146–66 (2001) 
[hereinafter HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN]. Decades later, in 2004, ten oil companies 
were convicted of rigging bids to supply the Japan Defense Agency; the Tokyo High Court sentenced 
nine company officials to terms ranging from six to eighteen months in prison—all of which were 
suspended. Id. at 163–64. See Oil Firms Fined for Rigging Bids, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at A9, 
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20040325a9.html. 
 23. Compare HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, supra note 22, at 143 (portraying 
Japanese courts as lacking sufficient enforcement power because, for them, “[a]ll remedies and 
sanctions must have specific statutory basis” and thus cannot be based in inherent judicial power) with 
J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 147–50 
(1998) (describing Japanese courts’ powers to fine or imprison stubborn parties and recalcitrant 
witnesses).  
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infrequency of administrative and judicial orders to enforce competition 
policy is quite striking in contrast to the U.S. enforcement agencies and 
the European Commission. For Haley, the failure of antitrust enforcement 
in this regard demonstrated a larger systemic weakness within the legal 
system as a whole.  
Similarly, the study of Japan and Germany highlighted the more 
centralized, public nature of enforcement. Perhaps nothing exemplifies this 
more than the rarity in these nations of the private damage action. Of 
course, it is perhaps difficult for someone coming from the American 
system to avoid a problem of perspective. The availability of treble 
damages in the United States, in contrast to Europe or Japan, tends to 
attract many more private plaintiffs.24 Thus, for the American observer, it 
is easy to take the United States—perhaps unwisely—as a baseline and 
marvel at the relative lack of private enforcement elsewhere. 
Haley avoided this perspective in part due to his wise choice of both 
Germany and Japan for comparison. Neither antitrust regime featured—or 
yet features—treble damages for private antitrust litigants.25 During the 
period studied, both yielded very low levels of private damage actions.26 
But private damage actions in these nations were not entirely absent, 
either.27 
By choosing systems in which private actions were similarly rare, it 
was possible to examine the relative constraints on these actions. The 
recipe for a winning private lawsuit requires a variety of ingredients, from 
available counsel and useful information, to damage awards that make the 
lawsuit worth the effort. Private litigation may fail to proceed for different 
reasons. According to Haley, in Germany, institutional barriers to private 
litigation were few; compared to Japan, Germany had relatively ample 
lawyers and judges and quick dockets.28 But the relevant German statutes 
greatly narrowed the class of individuals who could bring a private 
antitrust action.29 
 
 
 24. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and 
Europe, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 427, 435–37 (2005) (discussing the influence of treble damage 
provisions in increasing the number of private antitrust cases being filed in the United States by 
several orders of magnitude). 
 25. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Jurisdictional Conflict in Global Antitrust Enforcement, 16 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 365, 372–73 (2004) (noting that private treble damages are a uniquely American 
remedy and that most other regimes oppose the availability of multiple damages awards altogether). 
 26. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, supra note 22, at 150 (Germany), 155 (Japan). 
 27. Id. at 150 (Germany), 155 (Japan). 
 28. Id. at 151. 
 29. Id. at 150–57. 
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By contrast, Japan had a relatively favorable statutory authority for 
private damages.30 However, what were not constraints in Germany for 
private plaintiffs were constraints in Japan. At an overarching level, Japan 
had relatively few judges and lawyers available to deal with private 
antitrust cases.31 Thus, the institutional barriers were significant. More 
specifically, Japanese judges imposed fairly strict causation requirements 
on private plaintiffs.32 As a result of these limitations, what looked 
favorable on paper was not as favorable in practice.  
These observations concerning private damage remedies continue to be 
quite relevant today. While the United States considers the extent to which 
its private damage remedies go too far, the European Union has been 
considering how to encourage and incorporate more private litigation into 
its competition law.33 Understanding the pathology of failed private 
enforcement can be crucial in designing more effective private actions. 
Additionally, some factors encouraging private litigation may be more 
amenable to quick change than others—for example, damage multipliers 
compared to discovery regimes. Thus, a study of what can stall private 
antitrust litigation is useful for understanding what deficits merely 
discourage, as opposed to absolutely inhibit.  
What may be Haley’s most interesting suggestion in his comparative 
antitrust studies may also be his most relevant yet. Given the failure of 
private litigation and the lack of injunctive orders, Haley points to 
reputational sanctions as the chief weapon of German and Japanese 
antitrust enforcers. Although they have had other cudgels, such as 
monetary fines, Haley points out that these were historically quite 
minimal—with maximum fines in the early 1980s of forty thousand 
dollars for hard-core cartel behavior in Germany, and twenty thousand 
dollars in Japan.34  
The real impact of the fines, however, was to drive newspaper 
coverage of violations and attach adverse publicity to the violators. And, 
in Haley’s words, “[i]n both Germany and Japan publicity of violations 
 
 
 30. Id. at 154. 
 31. Id. at 156. 
 32. Id. at 154. 
 33. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages Actions for 
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/whitepaper_en.pdf; 
Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater & Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the Conditions of Claims for 
Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules (Aug. 31, 2004), available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf. 
 34. Haley, Antitrust Sanctions, supra note 8, at 481–83. 
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appears to be the most significant sanction imposed on offenders, and the 
most effective deterrent.”35 This kind of publicity harms the reputation of 
the offending corporation and may spur other government officials to act. 
Additionally, as Haley points out, in Japan the JFTC has the ability to 
quietly carry out enforcement by using the threat of adverse publicity to 
generate compliance.36 
The power of shame and reputation to shape behavior has become 
more widely accepted since Haley wrote in 1984 about the use of such 
sanctions by German and Japanese antitrust enforcers. Often, but not 
always, these kinds of sanctions are presented as alternatives to traditional 
regulation or perhaps as tools of private self-governance.37 There is little 
literature discussing the use of adverse publicity by government officials 
as a tool of economic regulation. Perhaps this is because, as Haley 
identified, there may be serious due process problems with adverse 
publicity as a government sanction; it is difficult to imagine how effective 
judicial review of such a punishment could take place.38 These 
fundamental problems may seem to swamp an analysis of the cost and 
benefits of such sanctions. 
That said, in societies where issues of due process and judicial review 
may not be as critical, the adverse publicity sanction that Haley identified 
may be quite relevant today. Indeed, the recent work of Curtis Milhaupt 
and Ben Liebman echoes this point in its description of Chinese authorities 
using public criticism to punish securities wrongdoers.39 Similarly, one 
positive view of China’s recently enacted Antimonopoly Law is that even 
a relatively toothless new antitrust enforcement agency might still possess 
the power to collect and disseminate information about the perceived 
harms of antitrust violations, which, in turn, could stir up demand for more 
enforcement.40 
 
 
 35. Id. at 505–08; HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, supra note 22, at 168. 
 36. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, supra note 22, at 169. 
 37. See id. at 168. 
 38. Id. at 170. 
 39. See Economic Focus: In the Stocks, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2008, at 82 (discussing the work of 
Liebman and Milhaupt). 
 40. See Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China—Scaling the Walls of Government 
Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 173, 177 (2008) (“[T]he anti-monopoly authorities have the chance to 
play a strong surveillance role, perhaps to use advocacy powers to catalogue and publish the (surely) 
thousands of illegal market-blocking restraints they may observe, to make proposals for remedies with 
teeth to the disciplining authority, and to tally up, publicly, the costs of the offenses to China.”). 
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IV. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF COMPETITION LAW 
A third way in which Haley’s work on comparative antitrust law 
remains relevant is his focus on the ideological basis and political context 
within which antitrust regimes operate. In particular, his comparison of 
Germany and Japan is interesting with regard to what he describes as the 
similar origins of their antitrust laws and similar low levels of 
enforcement, but quite different surrounding dynamics. 
Both nations inherited their antitrust laws from the postwar period of 
occupation.41 But for Haley, one of the key differences between these 
nations is the contrast between the development of a strong postwar 
ideological commitment to a liberal economic order in Germany with the 
entrenchment of a weaker commitment in Japan.42 His account is one of a 
strong German commitment to competition free of public and private 
restraints in the early postwar era, in contrast to the relative Japanese 
friendliness to Marxist and mercantilist policies.43 
It is hard to be sure how much weight to place on such observations. 
Ideological commitments are not easily measured, and they can be 
confounded by external factors. By 1957, Germany had joined the Treaty 
of Rome, beginning the process of delegating competition policy to a 
transnational body.44 Thus, the differences in competition ideology 
between Germany and Japan may have become less important than 
Germany’s incorporation into a wider community with its own ideological 
commitments. Strikingly, whatever their ideological leanings, Germany 
and Japan were able to accomplish their respective postwar economic 
miracles. 
Even so, the conception of ideological commitment and political 
context remains highly important to thinking about the future of antitrust. 
And not just for the design of new or reinvigorated antitrust regimes. As 
Haley pointed out,  
Antitrust policy does not create the conditions for new entry. 
Directed at the private sector, it deals with barriers created by 
dominant enterprises or through private collective action. The more 
serious barriers are those imposed by law and regulation. Far more 
 
 
 41. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, supra note 22, at 43–45 (Germany), 52–53 
(Japan). 
 42. Id. at 45, 52. 
 43. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, supra note 22, at 43–44, 52. 
 44. Id. at 50. 
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significant than antitrust controls is the commitment of governments 
to the vision on which they are founded.45 
Government action as a critical element in creating sustainable 
monopolies or cartels is a calling card of Chicago School antitrust.46 But 
as deployed by Haley, this concept is somewhat more susceptible to an 
optimistic interpretation. Instead, the subtext is that government can 
improve its own regulation by absorbing a culture of and making a 
commitment to competition. Thus, it is not enough to create a system that 
reacts to anticompetitive conduct. Ideally, and perhaps in defiance of the 
idea that regulatory capture operates as universally as gravity, there must 
also be a government commitment to the creation of an environment 
where competition can take place through entry and innovation. 
This conception of where antitrust currently stands, and where it may 
yet need to go, is an unresolved tension at the intersection of American 
antitrust and intellectual property law. It is at the heart of concerns over 
Microsoft’s power and doubts about the Microsoft case.47 In one of the 
most noteworthy of a significant number of recent U.S. Supreme Court 
antitrust cases, Verizon v. Trinko, we see an echo of this problem in Justice 
Scalia’s opinion. As he wrote, “The Sherman Act is indeed the ‘Magna 
Carta of free enterprise,’ but it does not give judges carte blanche to insist 
that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other 
approach might yield greater competition.”48 Rather, Scalia pointed to this 
task of actively reforming a monopolist as one more appropriate for an 
administrative agency with a commitment to effecting competition and 
better institutional competence for day-to-day supervision.49 
Thus, in Germany, Japan, the United States, and elsewhere, the 
problem of how to instill a government commitment to competitive 
markets continues to challenge us today. It would be a missed opportunity 
 
 
 45. Id. at 175. 
 46. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971).  
 47. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology 
Competition, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 68 (2002) (observing that “[t]here is currently considerable 
debate about whether aggressive antitrust enforcement helps or hinders the development of high 
technology”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 251–52, 254–
55 (2007) (discussing allegations by the Department of Justice that Microsoft “engaged in suppressing 
the innovations of others,” including Sun’s “Java virtual machine,” and the shifts required for antitrust 
to be able to address this kind of conduct). 
 48. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415–16 (2004) (citation 
omitted). 
 49. Id. 
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to stop short at the traditional conception of antitrust as a purely reactive 
instrument aimed at concrete private anticompetitive conduct. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To look at only one aspect of a career spanning several areas may not 
do justice to other linkages in Haley’s work. However, John Haley’s work 
on comparative antitrust law presents an interesting view of a significant 
area of law from an unusual angle. Rather than looking at how a single 
nation’s antitrust regime relates to its own ideology or politics, or looking 
at antitrust violations and enforcement abstracted from context, Haley 
managed to compare and contrast antitrust regimes in tandem with their 
ideological, political, and legal contexts. Doing so helps us see the ways in 
which antitrust can succeed or fail based on the infrastructure, both 
institutional and ideological, that it needs. 
It also helps us see the limits of traditional antitrust law in achieving its 
own goals. To the extent that Germany and Japan succeeded economically 
and fostered intense competition, both domestically and with their foreign 
competitors, it is easy to see that antitrust law in the form we conceive it—
as regulatory agencies and lawsuits—may not be the be-all-and-end-all of 
nurturing market competition.  
In a sense, one lesson to draw from these studies is a kind of tolerance 
of new antitrust regimes that may at first look slightly undercapitalized, or 
even ill-conceived. Certainly, no one would want to excuse incompetent 
institutional design. However, particularly when looking at new antitrust 
regimes, it may be worthwhile to consider whether they were designed 
less to reflect a desire to drive increased competition through courts and 
law. Instead, the goal of increasing a society’s awareness and commitment 
to the benefits of increased competition should not be discounted. 
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